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I. INTRODUCTION 
Pandemic influenza will pose tremendous challenges to health care pro-
viders, state public health authorities, and the public.  All will have to conduct 
business under the most adverse of circumstances.  It will be difficult for pro-
viders to meet the customary legal standards of care imposed by state and fed-
eral regulatory authorities, as well as the common law tort system.  This white 
paper will explore the legal issues associated with altered standards of care in 
pandemic influenza.  
II. STANDARDS OF CARE 
The concept of “standard of care” has several different meanings depend-
ing on the context.  In medicine, public health, and the other health professions, 
“standard of care” refers to accepted standards acknowledged by the profession 
as defining acceptable and appropriate practice.  Increasingly, these standards 
are developed by professional organizations, accrediting bodies, and govern-
ment agencies in processes that vary greatly in their democratic characteristics.1 
 Development efforts are designed to clarify, establish, and codify professional 
standards of care in an organized and accessible manner.2  
The concept of “standard of care” also has distinct meanings in the law.  
The term refers to a legal standard that must be followed to avoid liability, sanc-
tions, or other legal consequences.  Of note, the term “liability” is basically 
equivalent to legal accountability and, under civil law, generally involves the 
payment of compensation when such liability is found.  Sanctions are imposed 
under regulatory or criminal law, wherein the latter imposes a range of remedies 
and penalties for violations of various legal standards of conduct established in 
criminal statutes.  
A. The Standard of Care under Current Law 
There are three primary legal standards of care that will be most relevant 
during pandemic influenza, particularly during the time of the surge.  These are: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Behind the Veil Where the Action Is: Private Policy and 
American, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 154, 154-155 (1999). 
 2. See Eleanor D. Kinney, The Brave New World of Medical Standards of Care, 29 J. L. 
MED. & ETHICS 323 (2001). 
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 (1) tort standards pertaining to nonconsensual conduct that apply to all people; 
(2) regulatory standards for both health care facilities and health professionals; 
and (3) criminal standards that apply to all people.  For purposes of this paper, 
we will not discuss applicable criminal standards of conduct; although it should 
be noted that, following Hurricane Katrina, criminal prosecutions were brought 
against nursing home owners for negligent homicide in not moving their pa-
tients prior to the storm.3   
1. Tort Standard of Care 
In the tort standard of care, there are three predominant bases for liability: 
 (1) liability for intentional conduct; (2) liability for negligent conduct, and (3) 
strict liability pertaining to certain activities.  In intentional conduct, the tortfea-
sor is liable if he or she acts with “the purpose of producing that consequence” 
or “knows to a substantial certainty that the consequence will ensue from the 
person’s conduct.”4  Negligent conduct is a more complex concept and involves 
risk analysis with respect to one’s conduct vis-à-vis another person.  The Res-
tatement (3rd) Torts emphasizes a balancing of the risk of injury if precaution 
is not taken versus the utility of taking precautions that may cost large amounts 
of money, stating:   
A person acts with negligence if the person does not ex-
ercise reasonable care under all the circumstances. Pri-
mary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the 
person's conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseea-
ble likelihood that it will result in harm, the foreseeable 
severity of the harm that may ensue, and the burden that 
would be borne by the person and others if the person 
takes precautions that eliminate or reduce the possibility 
of harm.5  
The third basis of tort liability is strict liability, which pertains to injuries from 
abnormally dangerous activities,6 and also from the manufacture and sale of 
defective consumer products.7  The basic theory of strict liability is that the in-
                                                                                                                 
 
 3. Adam Nossiter, Trial Starts for Owners of Nursing Home Hit by Storm, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 17, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/17/us/nationalspecial/17nursing. 
html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss; see also Adam Nossitier, Nursing Home Owners Acquitted in 
Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/08/us/ 
nationalspecial/08nursing.html?fta=y.  
 4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (Proposed 
Draft No.1 2001).  
 5. Id. at § 3.  
 6. Id. at § 24.  
 7. Id. at § 1.  
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jured party need not prove fault on the part of the responsible party once causa-
tion is established.   
2. Relevant State Medical Liability Laws 
Most states have enacted statutes to address tort liability of health care 
professionals.8  In these states, the applicable standard of care varies by juris-
diction.9    In addition to setting the standard of care, states have also enacted 
statutes establishing pretrial procedural requirements, damage caps, and other 
reforms in an effort to reform the adjudication of malpractice cases.10  Indiana 
has had such a medical malpractice reform since 1975.11 
A majority of states have adopted a “national” standard of care, but a sig-
nificant minority still adheres to the “locality rule,” which focuses on local cus-
toms to determine the appropriate level of care.12  The locality rule, developed 
over 100 years ago, was intended to protect rural and small town physicians 
who were presumed to be less informed and well equipped than colleagues in 
large cities.13  The standard of care enunciated under the strictest version of the 
locality rule measures the conduct of a physician against that of other physi-
cians in the same field operating within the same community.14  Although most 
jurisdictions initially adopted the strict locality rule, many subsequently adopted 
a “modified locality rule” which is characterized as the degree of care, skill, and 
proficiency commonly exercised by ordinarily careful, skillful, and prudent 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §  6-5-540 (2008), ALASKA STAT. §  09.55.530 (2008), ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §  12-561 (2008), ARK. CODE ANN. §  16-114-201 (2008), COLO. REV. STAT. § 
 13-64-101 (2007), DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 18,  §  6801 (2008), D.C. CODE ANN. §  16-
2801(LexisNexis 2008), FLA. STAT. §  766.101 (2008), GA. CODE ANN. §  9-9-60 (2008), HAW. 
REV. STAT. §  671-1 (2008), IDAHO CODE ANN. §  6-1001- (2008), ILL. COMP. STAT. §  5/2-1701 
 (2008), IND. CODE § 34-18 (2006), IOWA CODE §  147.135 (2008), KAN. STAT. ANN. §§  60–
3501 (2006), KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §  304.40-250 (West 2008), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §  
40:1299.39 (2008), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §  2851 (2008), MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. 
§  2A-01 (2008), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231 §  60B (West 2008), MO. REV. STAT. §  
538.205 (2008), MONT. CODE ANN. §  27-6-101 (2007), NEB. REV. STAT. §  44-2801 (2008), 
NEV. REV. STAT. §  41A.003 (2007), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §  507-C1 (2008), N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§  41-5-1 (West 2008), N.C. GEN. STAT. §  99-21.50 (2008), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §  2323.41 
(West 2008), 40 PA. STAT. ANN §  1303.501 (West 2007), S.C. CODE ANN. §  15-79-110 (2007), 
TENN. CODE ANN. §§  29-26-1 (2008), TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001 (Vernon 
2007), UTAH CODE ANN. §  78-14-1 (2008), VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (2008), W. VA. CODE 
§ 55-7B-1 (2008), WIS. STAT. § 654.001 (2007).  See also Michelle Huckaby Lewis, et al., The 
Locality Rule and the Physician’s Dilemma:  Local Medical Practices vs the National Standard 
of Care, 297 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2633 (2007).  
 9. See statutes cited supra note 8.  
 10. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TORT 
LAWS (2005), available at http://www.ncsl.org/standcomm/sclaw/medmaltorttable205.htm.  
 11. IND. CODE § 34-18 (2006). 
 12. Lewis et al., supra note 8, at 2633-34.  
 13. See, e.g., Vergara v. Doan, 593 N.E.2d 185 (Ind. 1992); Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 
856 (Miss. 1985) (both cases discuss the history of the locality rule and cite to applicable stan-
dards of care in various states at the time of publication).  
 14. Lewis et al., supra note 8, at 2634. 
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physicians at the same time the treatment was provided and in similar locali-
ties.15  
States are moving toward a national standard of care that evaluates wheth-
er the physician has exercised the “care and skill which is expected of a reason-
ably competent practitioner in the same class to which he belongs acting in the 
same or similar circumstances.”16  Most states adopting the national standard 
treat locality as one of several factors to be considered to determine whether a 
physician has acted reasonably under the circumstances.17  Some states, howev-
er, apply a variation of the “locality rule,” or apply both standards of care de-
pending on whether the physician is a specialist.18    The District of Columbia 
and twenty-nine states have adopted the national standard of care and twenty-
one states continue to maintain some version of the “locality rule.”19   
Until 1992, Indiana followed the modified locality rule.20  That year, in 
Vergara v. Doan, the Indiana Supreme Court established the following stan-
dard: "[A] physician must exercise that degree of care, skill and proficiency 
exercised by reasonably careful, skillful, and prudent practitioners in the same 
class to which he belongs, acting under the same or similar circumstances."21  
In so doing, the Indiana Supreme Court adopted the national standard of care 
for Indiana. 
3. Regulatory Standards of Care 
The health care sector is one of the most regulated areas in the economy 
of the United States.  A myriad of state and federal regulatory regimes govern 
both health care professionals and facilities to achieve a variety of regulatory 
objectives.  These regulatory schemes involve both licensure and accreditation 
requirements.  
Licensure and accreditation norms generally set regulatory standards for 
competence, and, increasingly, quality of services.  Licensure for both profes-
sionals and facilities tends to both define the characteristics of the profession or 
facility and establish criteria and standards for meeting these definitive charac-
teristics.  Accreditation is basically the same as licensure except that the survey 
and certification function is carried out by a private organization.  Often, as is 
the case with hospitals, accreditation by a private accrediting body, i.e., the 
Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Sara Rosenbaum, The Impact of United States Law on Medicine as a Profession, 289 
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1546, 1551 (2003) (quoting Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass’n, 
349 A.2d 245, 249-50 (Md. 1975)).  
 17. Lewis et al., supra note 8, at 2635. 
 18. Id. (See tbl. labeled Box. Interpretation and Categories of State Statutes and Case Law 
on Standard of Care). 
 19. Id. at 2634. 
 20. See Vergara, 593 N.E.2d at 187. 
 21. Id. 
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(“JCAHO”), will be deemed to meet the conditions of state licensure and also 
the conditions of participation for third party payers.22  The conditions required 
under licensure and accreditation may be one source to which a court looks as it 
determines whether or not a defendant has met the standard of care.  
The federal Medicare program and joint federal-state Medicaid programs 
have an array of statutory and regulatory prescriptions governing health care 
providers to ensure that program beneficiaries receive high quality care for 
which payment is made.23  These standards are similar to licensure and accredi-
tation standards in terms of the conduct they require on the part of providers.  
Given the experience in Hurricane Katrina, the Centers for Medicare and Medi-
caid Services (“CMS”), the agency within the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services (“DHHS”) that administers the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP 
programs, waived many of these standards because of the extraordinary diffi-
culties compliance would have imposed on providers.24  
Specifically, CMS waived liability for hospital emergency rooms under 
the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (“EMTALA”) for transfer-
ring patients to other facilities for assessment if the original facility was located 
in an area where a public health emergency had been declared.25  CMS also 
waived certain Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) 
privacy requirements so that providers could talk to family members about a 
patient's condition when patients were unable to grant that permission to the 
provider. 26   
B. Professional Development of the Content of the Standard of Care 
It is important to appreciate that the ultimate source of these legal stan-
dards of care, particularly with respect to tort liability, are in fact professional 
norms.27  Since the 1980s, the medical profession and its medical specialties 
have engaged in the development of more formal standards of care in all areas 
of medical practice.28      
Further, the current standard of care in tort accommodates the fact that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 22. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Private Accreditation as a Substitute for Direct Government 
Regulation in Public Health Insurance Programs: When is it Appropriate? 57 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 50-57 (1994). 
 23. See Eleanor D. Kinney, The Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Programs Meet the 
Challenges of Public Health Emergencies, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 559 (2006).   
 24. Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid and the Uninsured, A Comparison of the Seventeen Ap-
proved Katrina Waivers (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/ 
7420.pdf; see also Priscilla D. Keith, Access to Care Issues Consumers Continue to Face as a 
Result of Katrina, 2 A.B.A. HEALTH ESOURCE  (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.abanet. 
org/health/esource/vol2no4. 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5(b)(3) (2009). 
 26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320b-5(b)(7)(A)(i) (2009); see also Standards for Privacy of Indivi-
dually Identifiable Health Information, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160–164 (2003).  
 27. See Kinney, supra note 2.    
 28. See id. 
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there may be legitimate variations in the conditions under which services are 
delivered with language such as “in like or similar circumstances.”29  Certainly 
a state agency, with its authority to promulgate public health regulations, could 
establish standards of care by regulation if that agency’s enabling legislation 
authorizes standard-setting activities. 30   
Thus, it is appropriate to rely on the flexibility of current standards to de-
velop protocols in conjunction with stakeholders.  To the extent that they have 
been developed in a fairly transparent and democratic process, model protocols 
will be authoritative in establishing the most appropriate standard of care.  In-
deed, governmental agencies have often adopted privately set standards in their 
regulatory programs.31  
III. STATE AUTHORITY AND ALTERED STANDARDS OF CARE 
The major sources of law that govern state public health matters are sta-
tutes that provide states the authority to protect and promote public health with-
in the state.  Most states also have specific statutes that authorize the governor 
of the state to declare an emergency and assume extraordinary powers to ad-
dress the emergency.32 These statutes often immunize emergency and public 
health workers from liability for negligent conduct during the emergency.33  
In 2006, Indiana revised its laws regarding public health and other emer-
gencies to provide the governor with emergency powers, including rulemaking 
powers, and to waive liability for negligent conduct in certain instances.34 Un-
der Indiana law, the Governor has the power to declare a state of emergency, 
which triggers authorizations to engage in many emergency response activi-
ties.35     
Additionally, it is important to note two model acts that are widely circu-
lated.  The first, the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act developed by 
the Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown University School of 
Law and the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health in collaboration with the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”),36 has been somewhat 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. See Kinney, supra note 22.  
 30. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Administrative Law Approaches to Medical Malpractice 
Reform, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 45 (2005). 
 31. See Kinney, supra note 1.   
 32. See Sharona Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility:  Liability and Immunity in Public 
Health Emergencies, 96 GEO L.J. 1913, 1923 (2008); James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., The Legal 
Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity Through the Use of Volunteer Health Professionals 
During Public Health Emergencies and Other Disasters, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 5, 23-24 (2005). 
 33. Hoffman, supra note 32 at 1946-50; Hodge, supra note 32 at 37-40. 
 34. IND. CODE § 10-14-3-12 (West 2008).  
 35. Id.  
 36. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT §§ 101–810 (Proposed Official 
Draft 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf; see 
also  Lawrence O. Gostin, et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Planning 
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politically controversial.37  The second, the Turning Point Model State Public 
Health Act,38 is developed by a collaborative group of public health policy 
makers and academics funded by the CDC and The Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation.  
A. Setting the Altered Standard of Care for a Public Health Emergency 
States do not require statutory authority to “alter” standards of medical 
treatment since such standards are established by professional organizations and 
individuals.  Under current law, states can convene relevant stakeholders to dis-
cuss and develop an altered standard of care pursuant to the conventional 
processes for developing standards by these persons and entities. 39   
Under a state’s authority to act in public health emergencies and to issue 
rules and orders to proceed in such emergencies, the state could issue an order 
recognizing that the previously developed protocol will be the altered standard 
of care in the public health emergency.  Ostensibly, the governor could declare 
a previously developed protocol as the altered standard of care in the emergen-
cy at hand, although the governor need not take this step to assure that the pro-
tocols be authoritative.  Nevertheless, such a rule— or even a declaration— 
would be useful in litigating cases and establishing the standard of care to be 
used in the situation.  The Indiana Code gives the Governor the power to issue 
rules and orders in the event of a public health emergency. 40  Similarly, the 
Turning Point Model Public Health Act accords such authority as well.41 
The most effective way to confer authority on a protocol establishing an 
altered standard of care in subsequent litigation is to develop the protocol be-
fore the emergency —using the ideal process described above.  Such a process 
would involve convening the major stakeholders from around the state to de-
velop the protocol in a transparent and democratic process involving broad con-
                                                                                                                 
for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 622 (2002). 
 37. See Sue Blevins, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: An Assault on Civil 
Liberties in the Name of Homeland Security, HERITAGE FOUND. LECTURE 748 (2002), available 
at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/HL748.cfm. (Interestingly enough, this 
piece is a critique from the perspective of the conservative Heritage Foundation); George J. 
Annas, Response, Bioterrorism and Public Health Law, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2685 (2002); 
George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Civil Liberties, 346 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1337 
(2002); see also MODEL ST. EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT §§ 11–89 (Proposed Official 
Draft 2002), available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/modelact.pdf.  
 38. MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT §§ 1-101–9-106 (Proposed Official Draft 2003), 
available at http://www.turningpointprogram.org/Pages/pdfs/statute_mod/MSPHAfinal.pdf; see 
also Benjamin Mason Meier, et al., Contrasting Experiences of State Public Health Law Reform 
Pursuant to the Turning Point Model State Public Health Act, 122 PUB. HEALTH REP. 559 
(2007); James G. Hodge Jr., et al., Transforming Public Health Law: The Turning Point Model 
State Public Health Act, 33 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 77 (2006).  
 39. See supra notes 22-26.  
 40. IND. CODE § 10-14-3-22 (2006).  
 41. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUBLIC HEALTH ACT § 6-102(d)(1) (2002); see also 
MODEL STATE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY POWERS ACT § 403(a)(1) (2001).    
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sultation with interested parties and the public.   
Also, the protocols would gain authority if they reflected consideration of 
other authoritative sources.  The Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research 
has developed a useful guide for developing protocols for an altered standard of 
care.42  The American Health Lawyers Association has also developed a tool to 
assist states in legal preparation for a public health emergency that specifically 
identifies key issues involved with developing protocols for altered standards of 
care. 43    
B. Modifying Liability Rules for Conduct during a Public Health Emergency 
State statutes that provide immunity from civil liability for health care 
providers and workers in emergency situations can greatly facilitate the imple-
mentation of altered standards of care.  While such statutes are not necessary, 
they clarify that health care providers will not be civilly liable for negligence in 
a declared public health emergency.  Such statutory provisions are important to 
provide legal “cover” in the event that stakeholders develop protocols for al-
tered standards of care that depart from the standard of care for negligence in 
the usual business environment.  
Once an emergency has been declared, Indiana law deems all emergency 
care workers, who are working in a governmental function not liable in tort for 
their actions, except where there is willful misconduct, gross negligence, or bad 
faith.44  The Indiana Code also provides specific immunity for both health care 
workers and facilities as long as they refrain from willful misconduct and gross 
negligence.45    
Furthermore, Indiana law provides health care workers immunity from 
liability for negligence in public health emergencies if they are licensed health 
care professionals operating under circumstances of a declared disaster.46  
These health care workers, however, are not immune from civil liability if dam-
ages result from gross negligence or willful misconduct.47  Facilities are also 
immune from civil liability in times of declared public health emergencies.48  
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, ALTERED STANDARDS OF CARE IN 
MASS CASUALTY EVENTS, (April 2007), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/altstand/ 
altstand.pdf.  See also AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, PROVIDING MASS 
MEDICAL CARE WITH SCARCE RESOURCES: A COMMUNITY PLANNING GUIDE (Feb. 2007), availa-
ble at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/mce/. 
 43. AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N, COMMUNITY PAN-FLU PREPAREDNESS: A CHECKLIST OF 
KEY LEGAL ISSUES FOR HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS (2008), available at http://www.healthlawyers.
org/Content/NavigationMenu/Public_Interest_and_Affairs/Public_Information_Series/Pan-
Flu08.pdf.  
 44. IND. CODE § 10-14-3-15 (2006). 
 45. Id. § 34-30-13.5. 
 46. Id. § 34-30-13.5-1. 
 47. Id. § 34-30-13.5-2. 
 48. Id. § 34-30-13.5-3. 
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Similarly, the Turning Point Model Public Health Act contains provisions re-
garding tort liability of health care providers and workers.49 
IV. CHALLENGES 
The challenges for the state, the providers, and the public will be legion 
during a pandemic, particularly during the pandemic’s surge.  The surge is the 
point in an epidemic when the most people are infected and the demand for 
medical resources and services is the greatest.  DHHS has developed computer 
programs that states and providers can use to estimate the demand for services 
and resources during the surge.50  Also, hospitals customarily estimate what 
their surge capacity is for any public health emergency.51 
Hospitals, nursing homes, home health care services, and other health care 
institutions are ill-prepared for a surge at any level, much less in the numbers 
expected in the event of pandemic influenza.  Although many hospitals could 
operate at 125% percent capacity or more for up to 72 hours, most cannot main-
tain this level of service beyond 3 days.52  An additional important issue is 
whether alternative sites, such as hotels, schools, offices, and churches, will be 
used for the delivery of care during the surge and at other times.53  Such unor-
thodox facilities probably could not provide services at the customary standard 
of care.  
A. Triage Methodologies 
Triage in a public health emergency is the process by which first respond-
ers will sort victims to determine priority for treatment with those whose condi-
tions will likely result in survival accorded medical care ahead of those unlikely 
to survive despite treatment and those who will survive regardless.54  This deci-
sion-making process will inevitably implicate legal doctrines pertaining to the 
standard of care.55  In the United States, health care and health law have tradi-
tionally focused on the individual patient.  Generally, a physician owes a duty 
                                                                                                                 
 
 49. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUBLIC HEALTH ACT § 6-105(b) (2002), supra note 41; 
see also MODEL STATE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY POWERS ACT § 804 (b) (2001), supra note 
41. 
 50. Ctr. for Disease Control, Pandemic Influenza Resources, Flu Surge 2.0, http://www. 
cdc.gov/flu/tools/flusurge/ (last visited June 17, 2008).  
 51. See J. Lee Jenkins, Robert E. O’Connor,  and David C. Cone,  Medicine  Differentiat-
ing Large-scale Surge versus Daily Surge, 13 ACAD. EMERG. MED. 1169 (2006).    
 52. U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND 
QUALITY, AHRQ PUB. NO. 06-0029, REOPENING SHUTTERED HOSPITALS TO EXPAND SURGE 
CAPACITY D-47 (2006), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/shuttered/shuthosp.htm. 
 53. Id.  
 54. George P. Smith, II, Re-Shaping the Common Good in Times of Public Health Emer-
gencies:  Validating Medical Triage,  18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 9 (2009). 
 55. See James G. Hodge, Jr., Legal Triage during Public Health Emergencies and Disas-
ters, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 627 (2006). 
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to provide the best care and seek the best outcome for each patient regardless of 
who is in the waiting room.  Failure to provide such care may subject the practi-
tioner to malpractice liability, professional penalties, and/or, in the most egre-
gious cases, criminal sanctions.56  However, in the event of pandemic influenza 
and an unusually large number of ill patients, physicians will necessarily focus 
on maximizing population outcomes rather than improving the health of indi-
viduals.57  The medical community will shift to a public health orientation that 
focuses on ensuring the health and safety of the population as a whole.58  Sig-
nificantly, the goal of providing optimal care to the population may require 
compromising best practices or providing less than optimal care to individual 
patients.  This approach, ethically intolerable or legally suspect under normal 
conditions, may be necessary and appropriate under disaster scenarios.59  Con-
sequently, pre-pandemic development of protocols for appropriate triage 
processes is essential.  Protocols must address issues such as who gets access to 
limited resources like ventilators versus less intensive or palliative care.   
Yet a 2006 literature review by a Canadian team of researchers found no 
current triage protocols for critical care in an influenza pandemic.60  The Cana-
dian team and others have since proposed triage protocols that differ in many 
respects but offer policymakers a starting point for pre-pandemic planning.61  
The proposals outline inclusion and exclusion criteria and identify the levels of 
treatment that are appropriate based thereon.  Most focus on symptoms and 
avoid subjective criteria like age and lifestyle.  These tools will assist first res-
ponders in making difficult decisions that allow for the optimal allocation of 
limited resources.  
Experts agree that successful implementation of a triage methodology re-
quires public discussion prior to the onset of a public health emergency.62  A 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. See supra note 8, and accompanying text; see also Ernest B. Abbott, Law, Federalism, 
the Constitution, and Control of Pandemic Flu, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 18, 207-08 
(2008).   
 57. Kristi I. Koenig, et al., Surging to the Right Standard of Care, 13 ACAD. EMERG. MED. 
195 (2007). 
 58. Elizabeth Weeks, Lessons from Katrina: Response, Recovery and the Public Health 
Infrastructure, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 251, 257 (2007).  
 59. Id. at 284; see also Hillary R. Ahle, Symposium: Shaping a New Direction in Law and 
Medicine: An International Debate on Culture, Disaster, Biotechnology and Public Health: 
Anticipating Pandemic Avian Influenza: Why the Federal and State Preparedness Plans are for 
the Birds, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 213, 248-249 (2007). 
 60. Michael D. Christian, et al., Development of a triage protocol for critical care during 
an influenza pandemic, 175 CMAJ 1377 (2006). 
 61. Id.  See Tia Powell et al., Allocation of Ventilators in a Public Health Disaster, 2 
DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 20 (2008); Daniel Talmor et al., Simple Triage 
Scoring System Predicting Death and the Need for Critical Care Resources During Epidemics, 
35 CRIT. CARE MED. 1251 (2007); Kristy Challen et al., Physiological-Social Score (PMEWS) 
vs. CURB-65 to Triage Pandemic Influenza: A Comparative Evaluation Study Using Communi-
ty-Acquired Pneumonia as a Proxy, 7 BMC HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH 33 (2007).  See also, 
John L. Hick and Daniel O’Laughlin, Concept of Operations for Triage of Mechanical Ventila-
tion in an Epidemic, 13 ACAD. EMER. MED. 223 (2006).  
 62. See Ahle, supra note 59, at 248-249. 
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public that is aware of and has the opportunity to participate in a forum address-
ing these very difficult issues will be less likely to view the decisions as unfair 
or motivated by suspected partiality.  Although frightening to many people, the 
responsible path is to reach a public consensus on triage well before the state is 
confronted with a public health disaster.       
Further, pre-epidemic planning will not only allow for discussion of the 
tort liability issues but will also allow for standards of care to be established in 
criminal law and anti-discrimination law.  Specifically, criminal statutes and 
also the common law torts of reckless and intentional conduct will apply in cas-
es in which decisions about access to life-saving treatment is withheld.63 
Of note, if people perceive that additional criteria—such as social utility 
of individuals have been used in triage decisions— health care providers may 
be liable for discrimination under federal and state civil rights laws. 64  Federal 
and state civil rights laws prohibit discrimination in public accommodations 
and access to government programs on the basis of race, religion, gender, and 
national origin.65  
B. Standard of Care for the Distribution of Vaccines and Antivirals 
As with any other health care service, the decision to allocate vaccines and 
antiviral medications are governed by tort and regulatory standards of care.66  
Thus, attention should be given to what are the appropriate protocols for the 
distribution of these products during pandemic influenza as part of the broader 
inquiry on altered standards of care.  
As a legal matter, the federal government has the nearly exclusive authori-
ty to regulate drugs, biologics, and medical devices and does so through the 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).67  In national planning for pandemic 
influenza, the federal government, through its various emergency planning doc-
uments, has recognized a predominant federal role for the distribution of vac-
cines and biologics.68  
Furthermore, federal law also addresses tort liability for injuries associated 
with pharmaceutical products including vaccines and medical devices.69  In re-
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. See supra notes 8-19 and accompanying text. 
 64. See Prohibition Against Discrimination or Segregation in Places of Public Accommo-
dation, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1999) (Americans with Disabilities Act, Title III requiring equal 
access to public places); 15 AM.JUR.2D Civil Rights § 223-231 (2000) (describing state civil 
rights laws).  
 65. Id. 
 66. See supra notes 1-29 and accompanying text  
 67. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331 (2009).   
 68. See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
(Nov. 2006), available at http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/implementationplan.; see also U.S. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Federal Planning & Response Activities, http://www.pandemicflu.gov/ 
plan/federal/index.html#implementation (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).  
 69. See Joseph Nicosia III, Note, Avian Flu: The Consumer Costs of Preparing for Global 
Pandemic, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 479, 494 (2006). 
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cent years, there have been several cases before the United States Supreme 
Court that have addressed whether federal regulatory law on labeling preempts 
state tort liability based on a failure to adequately warn of dangers associated 
with a medical product.70   In 2006, the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) asserted via drug labeling regulation that the FDCA preempted state 
tort law when it came to product labeling.71  The federal Turning Point Model 
State Public Health Act, if enacted, would immunize those administering vac-
cines from civil and criminal liability in a public health emergency.72   
C. Workforce Management and Altered Standards of Care 
Rampant absenteeism among health professionals during pandemic in-
fluenza could result in under-staffing to such an extent that ordinary legal stan-
dards of medical care will not be met.  As an altered standard of care is 
developed, the issue of absenteeism during pandemic influenza should be ad-
dressed.  In addition, a discussion of the appropriate use of volunteer health 
professionals during pandemic influenza and the creation of standards may help 
ensure a legal environment that will not discourage their much-needed assis-
tance.   
1. Absenteeism of Employed Health Care Workers 
The federal government has estimated that pandemic influenza could af-
fect 40% of the total workforce at its peak; that  rate of absenteeism during a 
pandemic may well be immobilizing.73  Potential reasons for employee absen-
teeism during pandemic influenza include illness or death, mandatory or volun-
tary isolation or quarantine, necessary care of children when schools have been 
closed, an inability to get to work due to halted public transportation, obliga-
tions to care for a sick family member, or a fear of either contracting or spread-
ing influenza at the workplace.74 
In a 2006 survey of the U.S. population conducted by the Harvard School 
of Public Health, 57% of Americans said they would cooperate with public 
health officials if instructed to stay home from work, and 35% said they would 
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Warner-
Lambert v. Kent, 128 S.Ct. 1168, 170 L.Ed.2d 51 2008 aff’d per curiam; Desiano v. Warner-
Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 999 (2008); 
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Apotex Inc., 521 F.3d 253 (3rd Cir. 2008).  
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 72. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUBLIC HEALTH ACT § 6-105, supra note 41. 
 73. U.S. DEP’TT OF LABOR,  OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., GUIDANCE ON 
PREPARING WORKPLACES FOR AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC 7 (2007), available at 
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 74. Id.  
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not.75  Also, this survey reported that 22% of employed adults expressed con-
cern that their employer would require them to work even if they were sick.76   
More recently, in 2002, a national survey of physicians found that only 55% of 
respondents believed that they had an obligation to care for patients in an epi-
demic during which their own health might be endangered.77  Such fears of 
health professionals are not unfounded.  In the 2003 SARS epidemic, health 
professionals were disproportionately infected with SARS in Vietnam, Hong 
Kong, and Canada.78   
Many strategies have been proposed and/or implemented in response to 
this threat of health professional absenteeism.  The American Medical Associa-
tion (“AMA”) has adopted several new policies focusing on physician respon-
sibilities during such emergency situations.79   One AMA policy, adopted in 
June 2004, states that “physicians have an obligation to provide urgent medical 
care during disasters . . . even in the face of greater than usual risks to their own 
safety, health or life.”80  This responsibility is limited, however, by the recogni-
tion that “the physician workforce . . . is not an unlimited resource . . . [and] 
physicians should balance immediate benefits to individual patients with ability 
to care for patients in the future.”81   
Different methods are being utilized to attempt to address this issue.  In 
Maryland, for example, health professionals are required to report to work dur-
ing medical emergencies or risk imprisonment.82  The Model State Emergency 
Health Powers Act authorizes licensure revocation by requiring that health pro-
fessionals provide care during a public health emergency “as a condition of li-
censure, authorization, or the ability to continue to function as a health care 
provider.”83  Another approach is to offer incentives discouraging absenteeism. 
 In Vietnam and Canada, for example, health care workers received additional 
pay for caring for SARS patients.84 
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Absent legislative or regulatory action at the federal and state level, there 
is a huge body of law regulating employment relationships that will apply in the 
event of pandemic influenza, just as it applies at any time.  Laws governing 
employment and worker protections include wage and hour policies, workers 
compensation, discrimination and other matters that are integral to the employ-
ment relationship.  These laws may work together to reduce the legal complexi-
ties related to absenteeism and limit employee violations of related workplace 
policies.     
2. Use of Volunteer Health Care Professionals  
There are three important legal issues with the use of volunteer profes-
sionals: provider liability for volunteer conduct in the delivery of services; pro-
vider liability for injury to volunteer professionals; and the portability of out-of-
state volunteer professional licenses.  These issues are analyzed extensively in 
an article by Professor James G. Hodge and colleagues. 85   
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress autho-
rized the DHHS to fund the Emergency System for Advanced Registration of 
Volunteer Health Professionals (“ESAR-VHP”).86  Under this system, thirty-
seven jurisdictions currently have operational advance registration systems, and 
the remaining jurisdictions have plans to become fully operational in the fu-
ture.87 
Although ESAR-VHP may allow for the rapid identification of qualified 
volunteers, licensure requirements will still have to be relaxed in order for vo-
lunteers to practice.  Most states and territories have agreed to provide for reci-
procity of licensure between jurisdictions for healthcare professionals.88  In 
addition, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (“EMAC”)—
developed by the National Emergency Management Association— allows for 
reciprocity between member jurisdictions regarding the credentialing of volun-
teers for the duration of an emergency.89  The Turning Point Model State Public 
Health Act also has extensive provisions regarding the licensure and appoint-
ment of health care personnel during a public health emergency.90 Indiana law 
specifically allows for volunteer workers from other jurisdictions to practice 
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and authorizes the use of the Indiana Worker’s Compensation program in the 
event of volunteer injury.91  In addition, the Indiana Code allows for mutual aid 
agreements, both among counties and between states.92   
V. CONCLUSION 
Recent events, such as Hurricane Katrina and 9/11, have highlighted the 
importance and necessity of preparing for emergencies and disasters before they 
occur.  The thoughtful preparation of altered standards of care plans prior to 
pandemic influenza is necessary to ensure that health care providers are empo-
wered to act in their communities’ best interests.  Such providers will be operat-
ing under significant duress in the wake of a pandemic, and the provision of 
legal guidance and protection is necessary to ensure that they act rapidly to mi-
tigate the spread of infection and adequately care for the afflicted.   
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